Wimblett v Chief Constable of Lancashire [2026] EWHC 1586 (KB) (judgment here)
When should a briefing officer be held liable in false imprisonment for giving mistaken information to the arresting officer? Is the position different if the briefing officer is dishonest in the information s/he provides? These are questions answered by the recent case of Wimblett.
The background
The Claimant’s former wife obtained a non-molestation order (NMO) against him. Thereafter, allegations were made to Lancashire police which, if true, meant that the Claimant was in breach of the NMO. PC Wade was assigned to the case. Following investigations, PC Wade learnt that the Claimant had moved to Devon.
PC Wade issued a Police National Computer Nominal (PNCN) marked as “Wanted Report with Power of Arrest”. This was effectively a “wanted” notice whereby the Claimant’s name was added to the PNC together with a brief outline of the circumstances and reasons why he was wanted. PC Wade explained in his witness statement that the PNCN meant “an arrest would be affected [sic] based on the circumstances I had provided in the Circulation Form” although he also explained that it would be for the actual arresting officer to determine when the time came whether there was in fact any necessity to arrest.
A short time after the PNCN was issued, the Claimant attended Torquay Police Station where he was arrested by PC Edmunds of the Devon and Cornwall Police. The Claimant was interviewed and then released. In the event, no further action was taken against him.
The Claimant brought a claim against Lancashire Police only, on the basis it had directly procured his wrongful arrest by circulating the PNCN. The Judge directed that, “The issue of vicarious liability shall be addressed as a preliminary issue.” It was agreed that vicarious liability was not the correct phrase; what was in issue was whether PC Wade had “procured” the arrest as an example of accessory liability.
At first instance, the Judge held that it could not be established that PC Wade was effectively the arresting officer and accordingly dismissed the claim in so far as brought on the basis of accessory liability. The Claimant appealed, contending that the Judge had failed to apply the law on accessory liability as set out by the Supreme Court in Lifestyle Equities CV v Ahmed (‘Lifestyle’ [2024] UKSC 17).
The decision
Mrs Justice Dias held, at paragraph 19, that following Lifestyle, the test for accessory liability is as follows:
(a) The primary actor, B, has committed a primary act involving certain essential facts making it a tort actionable by C;
(b) Either:
(i) The accessory, A, procured B to commit the primary act; or
(ii) A provided B with non-trivial assistance to commit the primary act, pursuant to a common design between A and B; and
(c) A knew (or turned a blind eye to) all of the essential facts which make the primary act a tort even if he did not appreciate that they were unlawful.
In this context, the primary act is the arrest. Step (a) will almost always be satisfied in false imprisonment cases arising from arrest. As false imprisonment is a tort of strict liability, the only essential fact which makes the arrest actionable is the fact of the arrest.
In this case the key elements were (b)(i) and (c), which Dias J analysed as giving rise to three issues [21]:
Issue (1): Did PC Wade procure the arrest of the Claimant?
Issue (2): If so, did his knowledge for the purposes of step (c) need to relate simply to the fact of the arrest, or did he also need to have known of or turned a blind eye to the absence of a defence on the part of the arresting officer?
Issue (3): Where does the burden of proof lie and what is required to satisfy it?
Issue 2: knowledge
Dias J started with issue 2 – knowledge – as she considered it the most straightforward. She concluded that the knowledge required does not relate to the presence or absence of a defence on the part of the arresting officer, for two reasons. First, because this is consistent with the authorities that an accessory can be liable irrespective of whether the arresting officer has a defence. Secondly, to find otherwise would be impractical – (i) the briefing officer is not privy to the mind of the arresting officer and (ii) there will inevitably be a lapse of time between any act of procurement and the actual arrest [22].
Issue 1: procurement
This was the critical issue. According to Dias J, there are two categories of factual situation in which the courts have held an arrest has been wrongfully procured [25]:
- Briefing/information cases, where the accessory provides misleading or incomplete information which nonetheless discloses on its face adequate and reasonable grounds on which the arresting officer acts.
- Direct order cases, where the accessory directs or orders the arresting officer to effect the arrest in circumstances where the arresting officer is effectively deprived of any opportunity to exercise independent judgment or discretion.
Dias J clarified that the two categories are not mutually exclusive [26].
In direct order cases, the question is simply whether the accessory was acting lawfully or not, irrespective of whether he/she was acting culpably or in good faith. This is because the accessory is effectively making the arrest through the arresting officer. Further, an arrest in these circumstances will almost inevitably be unlawful because of the failure of the arresting officer to exercise his/her own discretion [29].
By contrast, in briefing cases, there should be some element of wilful culpability before it can be said that the accessory has procured the arrest. Dias J’s rationale was that this was consistent with case law, including Lifestyle and there would potentially be significant implications if the threshold was lowered by which a private individual can become liable for false arrest by giving information to the police [30].
The kind of culpable behaviour expected to give rise to accessory liability in briefing cases would, according to Dias J, typically consist of “dishonesty or deliberate lying (including turning a blind eye)”, though this list is not exhaustive [32].
Applying the test to the circumstances of the case, Dias J was satisfied that no jury, properly directed could have included that PC Wade’s act of merely circulating the PNCN amounted to a direct order. She held that a PNCN is not an order or a direction to the arresting officer. Granting a power to arrest signifies no more than that an arrest may be effected if it is lawful to do so in accordance with section 24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. A PNCN does not have the same status as a warrant; the arresting officer still has to exercise his/her own discretion [33].
Rather, this was a pure briefing case. It was necessary, therefore, for PC Wade to have acted dishonestly or with some degree of wilful culpability in issuing the PNCN before it could be said that he directly encouraged or incited and thus procured the Claimant’s arrest [35]. In order to determine whether the first instance judge was right to dismiss the claim on the preliminary issue, Dias J first had to consider the burden of proof, however.
Issue 3: burden of proof
Dias J held that, in direct order cases, the claimant must plead and prove the direct order or instruction. If he/she does so, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove the lawfulness of the arrest [40].
Likewise, in briefing cases, the legal burden of proving that the arrest was procured by lies or other wilful culpability rests with the claimant. Dias J helpfully set out how this should operate in practice [44]:
(a) The words or conduct which are alleged to have given rise to a procurement in a pure briefing/information case must be pleaded with sufficient particularity to raise an issue;
(b) If they are and a prima facie case is raised, there is an evidential burden on the defendant to rebut the allegations, albeit the legal burden stays with the claimant throughout;
(c) However, unless and until such an allegation is made, there is no obligation on the defendant to adduce any evidence at all relating to potential procurement issues.
At first instance, the judge had not progressed through these steps, nevertheless dismissal was a result open to her on a correct approach. None of the pleaded matters were capable of giving rise to any serious issue as to PC Wade’s honesty, particularly given his uncontradicted evidence that the question of necessity was for the arresting officer at the time of arrest rather than for him [56] and [59].
Dias J therefore concluded that the claim based on accessory liability was rightly dismissed. The appeal failed.
Comment
This helpful decision is useful in two principal respects. First, it explains that, in briefing cases, wilful culpability is required before a briefing officer can be found responsible for an arrest. This is a fairly high threshold – typically consisting of dishonesty or deliberate lying. This sort of behaviour should not be the subject-matter of many police cases, one would anticipate.
The rationale for setting the threshold at this level is clear. In this scenario, information is being provided to the arresting officer, who must still determine for him/herself whether to exercise the discretion to arrest. Where it is a member of the public providing information to the police, in good faith, the courts are right to be slow in finding this third party liable for any arrest that eventuated. Consider, for example, a neighbour who sees what they consider is a burglar trying to break into a house. If they call the police and the suspect is arrested, even if it later turns out that the individual had a right to enter the premises, it would be unjust to hold the neighbour responsible. To do otherwise would discourage members of the public from being decent neighbours and calling police in good faith.
Second, it clarifies that the burden of proof is on the claimant to prove procurement. Unless and until, the allegation is made (and pleaded with sufficient particularity), the police do not need to adduce any evidence as to this issue. This feature of the judgment will be welcome to forces, faced with, at times, unfocused pleadings. It keeps attention squarely on the arresting officer, meaning that cases can be more proportionately defended.