Police Law Blog European Decisions Statutory Materials

Summonsing reluctant witnesses: Inquiries and Inquests

UCPI Designated Lawyer Officers Core Participant Group v Sir John Mitting (Chairman of the Undercover Policing Inquiry) [2026] EWHC 1394 (Admin) (judgment here) 9 June 2026

Anyone who thought that disappearing abroad would provide a procedural invisibility cloak if an Inquiry Chair or Coroner wanted to hear their evidence is now going to have to think again. In this latest Divisional Court decision arising out of the Undercover Policing Inquiry the Chair, Sir John Mitting, has just successfully defended his issuing of a witness summons to a witness abroad. Consequently any cloak may now wear thinner than an overused metaphor if that witness ever wants to set foot in the jurisdiction again.

The judgment contains a detailed judicial analysis of compulsory attendance powers and territorial limits challenging the previous assumption that inquiries (and by analogy inquests) have no power to summons a witness who is abroad.

The dispute

The Chairman of the Undercover Policing Inquiry wished to hear oral evidence from a former undercover officer known as HN86. He had lived overseas for around 25 years, remained a British citizen, and although he provided a witness statement, he declined to give evidence either in person or remotely.[1] The Chairman served a notice under section 21 of the Inquiries Act 2005[2] requiring him to attend the hearings in London in July 2026.

When the issuing of the summons was challenged by way of judicial review the central question was framed as: does an inquiry have the power to issue a summons under section 21 of the Inquiries Act 2005 compelling a person who is abroad to attend in London to give oral evidence?

AI-generated statements condemned by the Court of Appeal

R v Jerome Gibson [2026] EWCA Crim 1302, 22 September 2026, judgment here.

The Court of Appeal has issued a stark warning about the use of artificial intelligence (‘AI’) in criminal proceedings after discovering that a police officer used Microsoft Copilot to generate a victim personal statement (‘VPS’) designed to maximise emotional impact and so influence the sentencing of an offender.

Given the unrelenting march of AI-generated content already appearing in everything from police misconduct proceedings, inquests, and applications for judicial review,  this case nevertheless provides a stark early warning about the misuse of AI in any judicial forum.

The background

In criminal proceedings the accused had pleaded guilty to four offences of (i) GBH contrary to section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861; (ii) threatening with a bladed article, contrary to section 52(1) and (6) of the Offensive Weapons Act 2019, and (iii) two offences of damaging property, contrary to section 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971.  He had been sentenced to 44 months’ imprisonment.

When the offender sought permission to appeal his sentence, one of his grounds of appeal was that at the sentencing hearing the Crown had relied on a VPS which had been prepared by a police officer using a form of AI.

Liability for procuring an arrest

Wimblett v Chief Constable of Lancashire [2026] EWHC 1586 (KB) (judgment here)

When should a briefing officer be held liable in false imprisonment for giving mistaken information to the arresting officer? Is the position different if the briefing officer is dishonest in the information s/he provides? These are questions answered by the recent case of Wimblett.

The background

The Claimant’s former wife obtained a non-molestation order (NMO) against him. Thereafter, allegations were made to Lancashire police which, if true, meant that the Claimant was in breach of the NMO. PC Wade was assigned to the case. Following investigations, PC Wade learnt that the Claimant had moved to Devon.

PC Wade issued a Police National Computer Nominal (PNCN) marked as “Wanted Report with Power of Arrest”. This was effectively a “wanted” notice whereby the Claimant’s name was added to the PNC together with a brief outline of the circumstances and reasons why he was wanted. PC Wade explained in his witness statement that the PNCN meant “an arrest would be affected [sic] based on the circumstances I had provided in the Circulation Form” although he also explained that it would be for the actual arresting officer to determine when the time came whether there was in fact any necessity to arrest.

A short time after the PNCN was issued, the Claimant attended Torquay Police Station where he was arrested by PC Edmunds of the Devon and Cornwall Police. The Claimant was interviewed and then released. In the event, no further action was taken against him.

The Claimant brought a claim against Lancashire Police only, on the basis it had directly procured his wrongful arrest by circulating the PNCN. The Judge directed that, “The issue of vicarious liability shall be addressed as a preliminary issue.” It was agreed that vicarious liability was not the correct phrase; what was in issue was whether PC Wade had “procured” the arrest as an example of accessory liability.

At first instance, the Judge held that it could not be established that PC Wade was effectively the arresting officer and accordingly dismissed the claim in so far as brought on the basis of accessory liability. The Claimant appealed, contending that the Judge had failed to apply the law on accessory liability as set out by the Supreme Court in Lifestyle Equities CV v Ahmed (‘Lifestyle’ [2024] UKSC 17).

Police are entitled to rely on an ‘expert’ Coroner

R (Przybys) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2026] EWHC 1159 (Admin) 15 May 2026 (judgment here)

This Administrative Court decision reviews the interrelationship between police investigations, regulatory processes and coronial decision-making.  Although the Senior Coroner for Manchester City was not a party to these proceedings, the court identified the coroner’s earlier assessment of this being a natural death that did not require an inquest, as a factor which Greater Manchester Police (‘GMP’) was entitled to take into account when deciding not to launch a criminal investigation into alleged gross negligence manslaughter.

‘Island-hopping in a sea of evidence’: when to leave facts to an inquest jury

R (Rizvi) v HM Assistant Coroner for South London [2025] EWHC 3014 (Admin) judgment 17th Nov 2025 here

It has been a long journey for Mrs Rizvi who may now have exhausted all avenues in her attempts to show that the police breached an Article 2 duty owed to her daughter.  Twelve and a half years ago Sabina Rivzi was the innocent victim of a gang shooting as she drove away from Bexleyheath Police Station, having picked up her boyfriend after a police interview.  A High Court judge has now forcefully concluded that, having held an Article 2 compliant investigation and inquest, the Assistant Coroner[1] was entitled to consider it unsafe to leave any findings of fact to the jury regarding acts or omissions by the police. The Claimant’s counsel’s “island-hopping expedition in a sea of extensive evidence” did not persuade Mr Justice Foxton that it was arguable that the Coroner’s assessment that it would be unsafe to do so had been unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense.

This case importantly delineates the ambit of the Article 2 procedural duty on coroners. It is exactly what it says on the label – a duty of procedure and not one of outcome. It is quite a low threshold that triggers the procedural duty [2] to investigate an arguable Article 2 breach. But the hurdle to be surmounted before making any positive finding is somewhat higher once the evidence has been heard. In many cases a thorough exploration of all the evidence will reveal there is no state shortcoming that needs to be left to the jury, let alone reflected in the inquest’s conclusion.