R (Przybys) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2026] EWHC 1159 (Admin) 15 May 2026 (judgment here)

This Administrative Court decision reviews the interrelationship between police investigations, regulatory processes and coronial decision-making.  Although the Senior Coroner for Manchester City was not a party to these proceedings, the court identified the coroner’s earlier assessment of this being a natural death that did not require an inquest, as a factor which Greater Manchester Police (‘GMP’) was entitled to take into account when deciding not to launch a criminal investigation into alleged gross negligence manslaughter.

R (Rizvi) v HM Assistant Coroner for South London [2025] EWHC 3014 (Admin) judgment 17^th Nov 2025 here

It has been a long journey for Mrs Rizvi who may now have exhausted all avenues in her attempts to show that the police breached an Article 2 duty owed to her daughter.  Twelve and a half years ago Sabina Rivzi was the innocent victim of a gang shooting as she drove away from Bexleyheath Police Station, having picked up her boyfriend after a police interview.  A High Court judge has now forcefully concluded that, having held an Article 2 compliant investigation and inquest, the Assistant Coroner[1] was entitled to consider it unsafe to leave any findings of fact to the jury regarding acts or omissions by the police. The Claimant’s counsel’s “island-hopping expedition in a sea of extensive evidence” did not persuade Mr Justice Foxton that it was arguable that the Coroner’s assessment that it would be unsafe to do so had been unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense.

This case importantly delineates the ambit of the Article 2 procedural duty on coroners. It is exactly what it says on the label – a duty of procedure and not one of outcome. It is quite a low threshold that triggers the procedural duty [2] to investigate an arguable Article 2 breach. But the hurdle to be surmounted before making any positive finding is somewhat higher once the evidence has been heard. In many cases a thorough exploration of all the evidence will reveal there is no state shortcoming that needs to be left to the jury, let alone reflected in the inquest’s conclusion.

In the matter of an application by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland for Judicial Review (Appellant) [2025] UKSC 47 here

At approximately 11.15pm on 27 April 1994, 25-year-old Liam Paul Thompson was shot and killed near a gap in a peace line separating nationalist and unionist neighbourhoods in Belfast. No one has ever been held accountable for his death.

Indeed, in the context of what the Supreme Court describe as “egregious and profoundly disturbing delays” there has still not been an effective and Article 2 compliant investigation into Mr Thompson’s death.

The abortive inquest that was commenced in 2023 has, however, given the Supreme Court cause to answer an important question of principle: What test, and what level of scrutiny, should be applied by a court reviewing a decision to disclose material over which a claim of Public Interest Immunity (‘PII’) has been made?

In a unanimous judgment, overturning the decisions of the Coroner, a High Court Judge, and two Court of Appeal judges, the Supreme Court affirms that the question whether evidence is covered by PII is a substantive question of the law of evidence, not an exercise of judicial discretion. A first instance court must determine where the overall public interest lies, by conducting the balancing exercise set out in R v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police, Ex p Wiley [1995] 1 AC 274.  The inquisitorial nature of an inquest will raise the stakes in PII cases as compared to civil litigation. If the first instance court misidentifies the public interest, it has gone wrong in law and an appellate or reviewing court is required to consider the balancing exercise itself and correct the error.

The County Court has dismissed a claim for misfeasance in public office and vicarious liability brought against the Chief Constable of Nottinghamshire Police, arising from the actions of a former police constable, Craig Stant.

The Claimant, Ms A, alleged that while off duty the officer had pursued an inappropriate and coercive relationship with her after stopping her car and identifying himself as a police officer. She claimed that in doing so the officer was purporting to act in the course of his public duties and that the Chief Constable was therefore vicariously liable for his actions. The Chief Constable had dismissed the officer because of his actions towards Ms A. Damages were sought for misfeasance, personal injury, and aggravated and exemplary damages.

R (Ferguson) v  HM Assistant Coroner for Sefton, Knowsley & St Helens and the Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2025] EWHC 1901 (Admin) 23 July 2025 –  judgment here

Q1: What strength of evidence will make it arguable that an article 2 duty has arisen and/or make it arguable that a duty has been breached, so as to trigger an Art 2 compliant inquest?

Q2: For a mandatory jury to be required need there be an inappropriate act or omission by police, or is their mere involvement enough?

The answer to both these questions is now clarified in this latest Judicial Review decision from the High Court which underlines how, in respect of the “low arguability threshold” for Article 2 engagement, low really does mean low.

Her Ladyship’s “Article 2 in overview” section (see paras 14-37) is a clear and helpful exposition of the relevant law on the engagement of Art 2 procedural duties. Indeed, inquest practitioners might as well just copy and paste the text into their skeleton arguments (or coroners into their own judgments) to save themselves a lot of time.

It would be ridiculously presumptuous for this blog to even try to summarise it any further, beyond noting that Hill J clarifies that the low threshold of ‘arguability’ which will engage the procedural Article 2 duty applies not only to the question of any breach of a substantive art 2 duty, but also to whether any duty arises in the first place.

The meat of this case is, as with many cases, the application of the law to the unique facts and looking at whether the coroner had correctly applied that low arguability threshold in coming to his decision.