The County Court has dismissed a claim for misfeasance in public office and vicarious liability brought against the Chief Constable of Nottinghamshire Police, arising from the actions of a former police constable, Craig Stant.
The Claimant, Ms A, alleged that while off duty the officer had pursued an inappropriate and coercive relationship with her after stopping her car and identifying himself as a police officer. She claimed that in doing so the officer was purporting to act in the course of his public duties and that the Chief Constable was therefore vicariously liable for his actions. The Chief Constable had dismissed the officer because of his actions towards Ms A. Damages were sought for misfeasance, personal injury, and aggravated and exemplary damages.
The Defence
On behalf of the Chief Constable, it was argued that the officer’s conduct represented a “frolic of his own”, wholly unconnected to his role as a police officer. The officer had not exercised, or purported to exercise, any police powers, and his conduct was motivated by personal and sexual interest rather than public duty.
The Defence relied on established authority including Makanjuola v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (1990), Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215, N v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2006] EWHC 3041 (QB), and BXB v Trustees of the Barry Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses [2023] UKSC 15. Applying those principles, it was argued that there was no close connection between the officer’s wrongful acts and his policing functions capable of grounding vicarious liability.
The Issues
At trial, the Court considered whether the Claimant could establish that:
- The officer’s conduct was an exercise of public power;
- He acted with malice or reckless indifference to the illegality of his acts; and
- His actions were so closely connected with his employment that the Chief Constable could properly be held liable.
The Defendant submitted that the pleaded case on misfeasance was deficient: it failed to identify any power exercised or purportedly exercised, or facts from which malice could be inferred. The Claimant’s case conflated breaches of the Standards of Professional Behaviour (which are set out in schedule 2 of the Police (Conduct) Regulation 2020 and apply in police misconduct proceedings) with the tort of misfeasance.
The Judgment
The Court agreed. It found that:
- The officer’s behaviour, while reprehensible, was a misuse of his private life rather than an abuse of public power;
- He was not exercising, or purporting to exercise, any police power when he stopped or messaged the Claimant;
- There was no evidence of malice or of foresight of harm sufficient to sustain misfeasance; and
- The conduct was entirely unconnected with his policing duties, defeating the claim in vicarious liability.
The claim was accordingly dismissed in full, with the Court accepting the Defendant’s submission that the officer’s behaviour was a “frolic of his own”. The Chief Constable was awarded her costs (subject to QOCS).
Comment
The decision reinforces the stringent limits of both misfeasance in public office and vicarious liability in the policing context. Even where an officer’s off-duty conduct is morally or professionally wrong, it will not engage the liability of the Chief Constable unless it constitutes an abuse of a public function or is closely connected with acts the officer was authorised to perform.
The case provides a practical illustration of the Supreme Court’s approach in BXB, and a reminder that disciplinary misconduct does not equate to tortious wrongdoing.
Matthew Holdcroft of Serjeants’ Inn appeared for the Chief Constable of Nottinghamshire Police in this case.